Tens of thousands of Myanmar nationals have fled since the 2021 military coup to seek refuge in neighbouring India from persecution, conflict and widespread human rights abuses by the junta. Nearly four years later their plight is worsening.
Most of the post-coup Myanmar refugees have stayed in the northeastern state of Mizoram, scattered mainly across Siaha, Lawngtlai, Champhai, Lunglei and Aizawl districts. They now number as many as 50,000, local aid workers say, although the official count is closer to 30,000.
Initially, the state of Mizoram, with its shared ethnic and cultural ties to the people of neighbouring Chin State in Myanmar, welcomed the mostly Chin refugees fleeing the military crackdown. Humanitarian aid included food, clothing, shelter, healthcare, cash assistance and educational materials. Yet, over time the level of support has deteriorated. In particular, refugees in rural areas are struggling to feed and house themselves.
A refugee community leader from Lawngtlai recently told me, “At the beginning when we reached here, we received a substantial amount of support such as rice, clothes, utensils, etc. But now we no longer receive such things from the local people and very little support from other NGOs.”
Aid providers include local civic groups such as churches and youth and women’s associations, as well as international organisations working indirectly through local partners. However, weak coordination between these groups has compounded the crisis. The Network for Unity Association was formed in July last year to resolve this problem, but while several organisations have since joined the network, others have not.
United Nations agencies, meanwhile, lack the formal mandate to operate on the ground. India has not signed the 1951 Refugee Convention, which would legally obligate it to protect individuals fleeing persecution. The country also lacks a national refugee law or policy, leaving refugees with limited legal recourse or rights to stay in the country. This makes them vulnerable to arrest and deportation as “illegal migrants”, and easily exploited when they find informal work to make up for the limited aid.
The country has been more accommodating of other refugee populations, such as Tibetans escaping oppression from China, India’s long-time rival. This suggests its treatment of Myanmar refugees is shaped by geopolitics.
India has largely been hesitant to engage with Myanmar’s resistance forces or to take a strong stance on the post-coup crisis. Partly as a result, it has viewed Myanmar refugees through the narrow lens of internal security and border control. This has been exacerbated by a surge in weapons and drug smuggling, linked to armed resistance groups and criminal gangs operating on either side of the border. Indian authorities have consequently tried to monitor refugees more closely through a programme of biometric registration. The programme began last year in Manipur, a state that neighbours Mizoram, but has stumbled in Mizoram itself due to local opposition.
However, in recent months there have been signs of a shift in India’s approach.
News outlet Chin World reported that on November 11, government authorities that had previously stood by began to distribute rice to Myanmar refugees across Mizoram. India has also begun to quietly and tentatively engage with several of Myanmar’s resistance forces, including through talks on crossborder aid in October, I have heard from my personal networks. The details are kept under wraps, but in late February, an MP representing Mizoram openly met the Arakan Army on a crossborder trip, signalling a possible change in diplomatic strategy.
While these developments are promising, significant challenges remain. Besides the continued absence of official refugee agencies in Mizoram, and meagre coordination between existing humanitarian providers, local aid groups are also struggling financially.
The latter groups are left to provide the bulk of support, but they mostly lack licences or official bank accounts. This makes it hard to receive money from international donors. For example, the Mizoram-based Institute of Chin Affairs said it had successfully submitted a project proposal to the UN Refugee Agency on refugee education, but the project had to be cancelled because the UN agency said it could only transfer money into bank accounts registered in the name of the ICA. While local aid groups receive private donations from the global Chin diaspora, this money cannot cover all needs, particularly with Chin resistance groups across the border also competing for funds.
To address the various challenges, India should start by formally recognising Myanmar nationals seeking sanctuary in Mizoram as refugees rather than labelling them merely as immigrants. This would give them access to basic rights and protections under international law.
India should also establish its own national-level frameworks for refugee protection, while the Mizoram government should develop policies tailored to the specific, evolving needs of Myanmar refugees in the state.
In addition, India should work with international partners to increase the presence of humanitarian agencies in Mizoram and engage with the UN and other global bodies for technical and financial support.
Lastly, Mizoram-based humanitarian providers should develop a more coordinated response, reducing the current duplication of efforts and ensuring that resources are used more efficiently.
Through policy reforms, better coordination and greater international support, Myanmar refugees in India can at last be given the protection and assistance that they deserve.
R. Lakher is an analyst from Chin State with a master’s degree in public policy from the Kautilya School of Public Policy in India. He specialises in refugee affairs, Chin politics and India-Myanmar relations.
